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Introduction 
 
 
Network infrastructure as well as appliance/terminals suppliers , but also 
communications software , semiconductor , optical components producers 
,and installation/deployment/management / billing service companies have 
over the past 10-15 years undergone simultaneously four radical external 
revolutions : 
-the emergence and progressive domination of new technologies , such as 
Internet , wireless , broadband , and new semiconductor processes 
-the deregulation and fragmentation of their customer base (public operators , 
enterprise networks   
-the emergence of developing countries as major markets with leading edge 
demands 
-changes in financing principles for suppliers (using “vendor financing”) as 
well as their customers ( venture-like financing , heavy debt financing) 
 
Whereas the above is widely researched , far less attention has gone into the 
operations and internal processes at these suppliers . At best , there has been 
a scattered debate as to what the “core business” and the ”core competencies 
” were , with no clear conclusions emerging . 
 
 
1.The intrinsic capital  and knowledge bases of 
Communications industry suppliers 
 
Historically , the base for most communications industry suppliers were end-
to-end supply to monopolistic customers of telephone systems (from 
telephone access, to transmission , switches and network management) ,and 
progressively also of X25 packet communication systems (data terminals , 
routers ,and network management) . 
While the complexity was significant , often because of many 
national/localized adaptations (signaling , electrical characteristics ,internal 
organization at the client’s..) ,orders were still for networks or their capacity 
expansion or coverage .In almost all cases, manufacturing was an integral 
and profitable part of the supplier’s organization . 
 
With the deregulation of telephone sets and of data terminals , emerged the 
first time the question whether the systems’ suppliers should manufacture and 
design these access terminals .In most cases , the decisions were to spin-off 
or outsource such manufacturing and very quickly also their design . 
 
Ever since, the trend has accelerated to affect the: 
- outsourcing of almost all manufacturing of system’s nodes ,  
- the co-design of key semiconductor or optical devices , shared between 
the communications industry and the semiconductor industry or the design 
houses  
- the commercial acquisition and customization of large parts of the 
operating systems and middleware 
- sometimes immoderate uses of consultants not just as buffer work 
capacity , but for key specification , design ,testing or other tasks  
 
This leads to identify three essential capital bases for communications 
industry suppliers, in addition of course to the financial capital defined in 
company accounts : 
 
a)The Intellectual capital and know-how capital , represented legally by 
inventions, patents , trademarks , process know-how and similar , and for 
which legal filing, protection and review mechanisms exists backed up by 
trade agreements and treaties  
 
b)The competence capital ,which is the subjective set of skills, experience and 
contacts which staff brings to a company , and which the learning-by-doing 
process enhance as well as some occasional company initiated competence 
development activities .In this competence capital should be featured key staff 
,and experts , who have a combination of higher creative skills, 
implementation skills and communication skills to their co-workers ,and 
sometimes to the community at large .Competence capital evaluation is a 
complex process, but it must obey to a cumulative process over time , with 
leakage linked to staff departure , to competence decay ,and sometimes to 
external factors who may make worthless some specific skills .  
 
c)The customer trust capital base , which is not to be confused with the 
bilateral trade between a supplier and one of its customers , but with the 
depth , duration , credibility and trust of such a customer towards its suppliers 
. In one word it could be called the “depth of the relationship” .One trend has 
increased the customer trust base, which is the erosion of research and most 
technical activities at communications operators , who then have to rely more 
and more on their suppliers for their technical and some  
other strategic choices .A reverse trend has been that,  with the emergence of 
open standards in middleware ,interconnect and other API’s , a 
communications operator or enterprise networking supplier can now in 
principle switch suppliers provided the new suppliers meet the same interface 
standards as the incumbent suppliers . The “depth of the relationship” is also 
always the compounded result of the relative internal forces, both at 
operator/enterprise end, as well as supplier end , between technical, 
operations, purchasing and financial decision makers . One clear trend 
however has been that, while this customer trust base is also a cumulative 
process, its rate of change (up or down) has vastly accelerated recently.  
 
It should be noted that , for communications industry suppliers, the financial 
capital structure alone fails to give concrete indications as to the real value 
and survivability of  such suppliers . At best the financial capital structure and 
the cash flow allow to gage the pricing and cost base and the management of 
receivables ,as well indirectly as product/project/resource  management 
quality  . 
 
 
2.The predators 
 
As the business records of the past 10-15 years have shown ,and apart from 
the special case of mergers and acquisitions of and amongst communications 
industry start-ups , the consolidation has not been so much within 
communications industry suppliers .  One main reason has been 
heterogeneous elements  amongst the competence capital , the customer 
trust base and sometimes geographical localization and cost structures of the 
same . 
 
Therefore predators have been from other sectors and the major strategic 
motivations have been : 
 
a)for component suppliers (hardware, semiconductor , software , packaging, 
...) to move up the value chain to grasp sub-systems or systems in growing 
communication offerings 
 
b) for IT or computer industry suppliers to capitalize on high , but falling , 
computer sub-systems volumes ,to enhance them for the communications 
service needs ,and, in that process, to improve the quality and dependability 
of computer equipments . In some cases, such IT or computer industry 
suppliers attempt to achieve a monopoly in selected network architecture 
nodes (application servers , authentification servers , base station controllers , 
....) 
 
c) for consultants to occupy the place left open by the communications 
operators /enterprises in the field of service creation and service management 
,as the diversity of these has been growing very fast with new technologies 
and open standards 
 
d) for contract manufacturers to absorb the plants and production staff of 
communications industry suppliers ,although they had not realized that they 
would have a hard time going beyond bill-of-materials skills to reach 
architectural know-how and IPR  without long lasting investments 
 
e)for software products industry to enlarge its product portofolio to include 
major high-value packages sold by the communications industry suppliers 
(such as network management, billing systems, customer-care systems , 
messaging, security software   ) or used by these for their internal  processes 
(ERP, documentation  , CAD , test systems)  
 
f) for all the above to make the communications industry supplier bear the 
cost of risk research , of pre-standardization work, of standardization/lobbying 
,of integration into very complex networks and systems , and of high cost 
initial engineering , productization and debugging  
 
 
For these predators , two mechanisms have or are being used : 
 
-merger and acquisitions , typically of communications industry supplier’s 
plants , but also of non-core product lines or divisions ; in most cases , these 
deals have been carried out with financial valuation methods (or palettes 
thereof) which by and large have neglected totally the intellectual capital , the 
competence capital ,and the customer trust capital  
 
-a “strangling approach “ using technical dependencies as trigger events ,and 
business models thereafter ,and finally “strategic agreements” aiming at 
competence/IPR/customer trust  transfer from the communications industry 
supplier to a predator ;the core of this approach is precisely to take over the 
intellectual capital, the competence capital and/or the trust capital  
 
 
3. Case (A) : A software industry predator 
 
 In this Case, as well as in the following, we will , for the “strangling process” 
itemize the process and its impact on the intellectual , competence and 
customer trust capitals of the communications industry supplier. 
 
The Case pertains to a software industry player, supplying a middleware 
component to a communications industry supplier .The general strategy used 
by the software supplier is a one of reducing the credibility of the 
communications suppliers, and to deploy a business model whereby 
communications systems suppliers and users are both  being “taxed” ,  
although alternative technologies exist ,some standardized by open ISO 
processes . The approach used by this software industry predator is also dual 
: 
 
-merger and acquisition of start-up’s and some other communications industry 
operations , including hardware ; it is interesting to note that most of these 
activities have failed , less because of external demand weaknesses, than 
because of internal fights where communications enhanced technologies and 
products were “forced” to report to established product lines , leading to bad 
technical solutions , de-motivated new employees  ,and total lack of trust with 
the customers of the acquired party 
 
-“strangling” of the communications industry supplier  by the following process 
: 
 
Table 1: Software industry predator process 
 
 
 
 STEP PROCESS IMPACT 
on 
Intellectual 
capital 
IMPACT 
on 
Competen
ce capital 
IMPACT on 
Customer 
trust capital 
1 Specify alone ,and brand a 
software of rather simple design 
, but with novel functionalities 
 Competitio
n on 
innovation 
is fair 
 
2 Apply substantial marketing 
power to publicize this brand 
,not the least with 
communications operators , so 
the communications industry 
suppliers would be forced to 
meet their customer’s 
“demands” or inquiries 
 
  Negative as 
it reduces 
sometimes 
credibility of 
communicat
ions 
supplier, 
especially if 
they have 
researched 
the same 
functionality 
3 Apply substantial  lobbying at 
technical management level at 
communications industry 
supplier’s , essentially to tell 
these management levels that 
they would be “left behind” if 
they don’t commit to this 
software 
 Negative 
as it 
correspond
s to 
criticize 
internal 
resources 
developing 
same 
 
functionalit
y 
4 Charge a developer’s license 
,and impose a trademark license 
for the brand 
 
Negative if 
license 
prevents 
from doing 
internal 
work in 
same area 
 Negative as 
operator is 
used to only 
the 
communicat
ions 
supplier’s 
brand  
5 Impose the software vendor , or 
a proxy to it , as the sole party 
who can develop conformance 
test suites in view of use of the 
brand by communications 
supplier in his products when 
they embed this software 
 
  Negative as 
operator is 
used to 
open public 
conformanc
e suites 
6 Charge a license fee for test 
suite(s),and force resource 
allocation to the task 
 Negative 
as 
resource 
could be 
used better 
to enhance 
IPR capital 
 
7 Charge a royalty on software 
when embedded into supplier’s 
products 
  Positive if 
royalty cost 
is less than 
depreciation 
of a 
communicat
ions 
supplier’s 
alternative 
solution 
8 Charge a test suite license (in 
view of the branding) and a 
distribution license to operator 
on products received from 
supplier 
  Negative as 
this time 
operator will 
ask 
communicat
ions 
supplier why 
he forced 
this side-
cost 
9 Offer a R&D collaboration to 
supplier, with free evaluation 
license by software company on 
communications supplier’s add-
on’s 
Negative 
as no pay-
back on 
IPR  
Negative 
as freedom 
is limited  
 
10 Include same functionality as 
obtained under Step 9, but 
under independent 
implementation into software 
product 
Negative 
as 
functionalit
y is hard to 
protect 
legally  
Positive for 
those who 
see their 
ideas 
diffuse  
 
11 Charge a license to 
communications supplier for 
enhancement 10. Which 
originates in 9.,and under 
software company’s  brand 
 Negative 
as 
communic
ations 
supplier 
have to 
pay twice  
Negative 
12 Integrate communications 
software protocols into software 
product (signalling , protocols , 
OSS ,..) 
Negative 
as 
communic
ations 
suppliers 
must 
protect all 
implement
ations of 
communic
ations 
stacks 
Negative 
as staff is 
left only to 
maintain 
“old” 
versions “ 
of 
communic
ations 
software 
Negative as 
“image” in 
communicat
ions 
software 
field shifts to 
software 
industry 
 
 
 
4.Case (B): a contract manufacturer predator 
 
In this Case, as well as in the following, we will , for the “strangling process” 
itemize the process and its impact on the intellectual , competence and 
customer trust capitals of the communications industry supplier. 
 
The Case pertains to a contract manufacturer, with its roots in mechanical 
assembly , who carried out an aggressive set of opportunities to take over (in 
general for free) some manufacturing operations of a diversity of weakened 
communications industry suppliers . The goal was to migrate from contract 
manufacturing to design and test services , to acquire design know-how,and 
to produce unbranded communications products competing with those of its 
original customer . 
 
Thus here again ,the predator has a dual approach : 
 
-merger and acquisitions : essentially , the predator off-loaded the 
communications industry supplier of social costs and underutilized production 
capacities, got some initial orders as part of the deal, but never committed to 
manufacturing or engineering price levels ;the result is that , after  some time, 
the same production cost for the same item goes substantially up with no 
quality guarantees possible 
-“strangling” process initiated under the excuse of shared traditions, design 
methodologies and better purchasing power at component level ; the target 
was to carry out test, low volume /prototyping assembly , engineering services 
, as well as to help the communications industry supplier with faster 
industrialization services for its end customers .Thus the process and its 
impacts for the communications industry supplier were the following : 
 
  
Table 2: Contract manufacturer industry predator process 
 
 
STEP PROCESS IMPACT 
on 
Intellectual 
capital 
IMPACT 
on 
Competen
ce capital 
IMPACT on 
Customer 
trust capital 
1 Offer low volume manufacturing 
(prototypes ,...)  
 Faster and 
fabless 
delivery of 
prototypes 
Faster 
access to 
prototypes 
for 
evaluation 
2 Offer test design and test 
execution services , often with 
tools and fixtures inherited from 
communications industry 
supplier  
 
 Negative 
as 
concurrent 
design and 
testing are 
key for 
enhancing 
designs 
 
3 Offer integration services  Negative 
as 
architectur
al 
specificatio
ns , tricks 
and know 
how got 
transferred 
in effect 
without 
real IPR 
protection 
Negative 
as 
integration 
staff 
leaves and 
joins 
contract 
manufactur
er 
Negative as 
communicat
ions 
industry 
supplier 
looks as 
incapable of 
being a 
systems 
integrator 
4 Offer volume component 
purchasing services 
 
Negative 
as 
component 
supplier 
data and 
choices 
get 
compromis
ed 
Negative 
on 
sourcing 
staff 
 
5 Renegotiate contract 
manufacturing and service 
contracts to add contract 
manufacturer’s so-called “own” 
IPR and licensing terms (know 
how not backed up by own 
investments but happening by 
Step 3) 
 
Negative   Negative as 
operator 
buys less 
from 
communicat
ions 
supplier, 
because of  
less trust in 
contract 
manufacture
r’s abilities 
and concern 
for operator  
6 Offer to third parties unbranded 
down scale  products competing 
with original communications 
supplier’s  
 Negative 
as  staff’s 
pride is 
diminished 
and some 
leave for 
contract 
manufactur
er 
Negative as 
operator 
may switch 
to 
unbranded 
cheaper 
product 
assuming its 
design to be 
dependable 
7 Sell product line as part of a 
focussing strategy ,often to 
lower cost manufacturers  
Negative 
on 
royalties  
Negative 
on staff 
which is 
often being 
made 
redundant 
both at 
communic
ations 
supplier as 
well as 
contract 
manufactur
er  
Negative in 
general 
 
 
5. Case (C) : a semiconductor supplier predator 
 
In this Case we will again , for the “strangling process” itemize the process 
and its impact on the intellectual , competence and customer trust capitals of 
the communications industry supplier. 
 
In this Case , the strategy of the semiconductor supplier is to go up the value 
chain by claiming that its process and volume advantages will be of benefit to 
the communications industry supplier as well as to the operators , although he 
may fail to say that the architectures and price levels may be quite different 
and reduce the learning curve benefits . 
 
The merger and acquisition process does not affect the communications 
industry supplier ,as the focus of the semiconductor supplier is on investing in 
start-up’s and individuals who may allow it to leapfrog the communications 
industry’s supplier’s know how and competence in a generic area (a 
“platform”)  
 
The “strangling” process thereafter as the following steps   : 
  
Table 3: Semiconductor  industry predator process 
 
 
STEP PROCESS IMPACT 
on 
Intellectual 
capital 
IMPACT 
on 
Competen
ce capital 
IMPACT on 
Customer 
trust capital 
1 Invest in start-up’s and 
individuals with generic 
technologies at a low level, 
which are being forced via 
financial controls to abide with 
the semiconductor’s 
processes, IPR and proprietary 
architectures   
Lost 
opportuniti
es to 
acquire 
cheap 
some 
potential 
relevant 
IPR 
  
2 Organize a fully controlled 
industry forum with strict NDA 
rules ,and mandated 
dependency on the 
semiconductor supplier’s prior 
architectures and proprietary 
standards  
 
 Positive as 
staff asked 
to join 
individually 
may feel 
that they 
are 
important  
 
3 Carry out a heavy marketing 
campaign around yet-to-be 
products claiming industry 
backing by the other parties in 
the controlled industry forum ; 
lobby operators as to the future 
capabilities and cost benefits 
to them  
Negative 
as 
architectur
al 
specificatio
ns , tricks 
and know 
how got 
transferred 
in effect 
without 
real IPR 
protection 
Negative 
as staff is 
confused 
about 
either 
doing their 
own thing, 
or buying 
in  
Negative as 
operators 
are 
confused as 
to why 
communicat
ions 
industry 
supplier 
charges 
more than 
they are told 
they should 
by 
semiconduc
tor vendor 
4 Lobby technical and sourcing 
management of 
communications industry 
supplier as to cheaper prices 
,volume advantages , for yet-
to-be-seen and yet-to-be-
priced products ; pressure from 
operator feedbacks ; holding 
back access to key 
components 
 
Negative 
as no open 
standardiz
ation is 
possible 
and IPR is 
made 
dependent 
on 
semicondu
ctor 
supplier’s 
IPR  
Negative 
on staff 
who sees 
R&D 
budgets 
and 
products 
curtailed to 
the benefit 
of external 
paper 
products 
Positive with 
buyers ; 
negative 
with 
operator’s 
technical 
resources 
who see 
delays 
ahead 
5 Offer bundled components and 
sub-systems ,integrated by 
semiconductor vendor’s 
systems divisions 
 
Negative 
as 
architectur
al 
innovation 
vanes 
Negative 
as 
resources 
are laid off 
because of 
operating 
costs , 
rarely 
objectively 
compared 
with the 
semicondu
ctor'’ sub-
system 
life-cycle 
costs to 
the 
communic
ations 
supplier 
Positive as 
communicat
ions 
supplier is 
seen as 
embarking 
on “industry 
standards” 
,until life-
cycle added 
costs 
become 
apparent to 
operator 
6 Stop supplying components to 
communications systems 
supplier, who is forced to adopt 
sub-systems bundles ,and in 
effect withdraw from platforms 
area 
No IPR 
generated 
around 
platform 
Staff laid 
off  
Negative as 
operator 
supports all 
trouble with 
new field 
support , 
higher 
prices ,etc  
 
 
6. Discussion of cases 
 
It should first be noted that, for each of the three Cases (A-C) , there are more 
than one ,often minimum two suppliers applying such processes towards 
communications industry suppliers . It is not feasible to disclose here these 
predator suppliers . 
 
Next , the quantifiable impact on the IPR capital , competence capital ,and 
customer trust capital, of these processes depend very much on the patent 
portofolio mix, of the product/system/service mix , on the personnel age 
/experience / skills distributions ,and finally of the technology bases and 
established customer bases .It is also difficult to quantify this impact in 
absolute terms as the three types of capital do not have established 
measurements recognized by accounting standards  
 
Nevertheless, the three Cases are representative of needs of most 
communications industry suppliers , so that they are affected by these three  
processes altogether due to the global character of the operations of most 
predators and of the communications suppliers themselves . 
 
An attempt is therefore made to evaluate the relative impact of the three 
processes, using publicly available elements pertaining to the patent portofolio 
, personnel resource distribution ,and the announced product plans and 
contracts over the period mid 2002-end 2004 ,by relatively large 
communications industry suppliers , which : 
-either have a fairly diversified communications product/service portofolio : 
Lucent , Nortel , Siemens (ICN+ICM) , Ericsson , Alcatel (excluding space 
activities and others) ,NEC (Communications Div)  
-or have a more focussed communications product/service portofolio : Nokia , 
Marconi , Tellabs  
 
The result of the evaluation are relative impact ranges , over the mid 2002-
end 2004 period, with the mid-2002 period as a base for the three forms of 
capital : 
 
Table 4 : Cumulative relative impact table from predatory processes aiming at 
communications industry suppliers , in % , mid-2002 to end 2004 , with base 
mid 2002 
 
 
PROCESS Relative impact 
on IPR capital 
Relative impact 
on competence 
capital 
Relative impact 
on client trust 
capital 
Case A: software 2-5 % 0- 7 % 0-4 % 
Case B : contract 
manufacturing 
4-16 % 2-18 % 6-14 % 
Case C: 
semiconductor 
8-25 % 5-20 % 10-25 % 
Minimum 
(maximum) 
cumulated 
relative impact in 
% , 2002-2004  
14 % (46 %) 7 % (45 %)  16 % (43 %)  
 
 
 
Obviously the maximum relative cumulated impacts are unrealistic, but the 
very fact that they are all three in the 45 % domain is perceptually indicative of 
both a tolerance level ,or of an awakening level , at the communications 
industry supplier’s . The debate as to the ratio of dependency towards non-
communications industry suppliers for core technologies , skills and customer 
relations  ,is very rarely debated , except for: 
- purchasing/sourcing departments who saw in positive eyes higher 
dependencies (up to 50 %) if the short term costs offer short term financial 
benefits on the operating costs 
- financial management who see that the non-communications industry 
suppliers, with such predatory processes, reap the higher margins 
elements and leave the resource costly and low margin activities to the 
communications industry suppliers 
- technical managers who would normally fight against any “N.I.H” level 
higher than the very minimum, in the 10-15 % range ;if they seem to be 
alerted to the situation it is interestingly enough because the estimated 
Minimum cumulative relative impact levels from the Table , have reached 
the alarm level for this category of decision makers  
 
7. The communications industry suppliers’ defense and 
offensive strategies 
 
Here are short formulations of such strategies, the relative impacts of which 
can also be estimated via an impact table like Table 4 . 
 
a) Mandate open public standards (ISO process) compliance in all sourced 
products or technologies :   
 
      The growing importance of 3GPP , IETF , OMG , OMA is an illustration of 
this , as it allows in theory to switch component vendors , but not systems 
vendors or know how suppliers (such as consultants)  
 
b) Cooperative funding , or “pool companies” to develop generic components 
to communications industry specifications , and with test and integration by 
the communications industry 
 
Symbian , power module industry ,and in effect semiconductor foundries , 
are examples thereof   
 
c) Collaboration of communications industry suppliers in joint specifications 
beyond standards (or prior to standards are published)  
 
This is a difficult process due to anti-trust policies , but recent political 
initiatives have pointed at the benefits of such approaches for the industry 
at least on regional basis (European Union, China/Taiwan ) 
 
d) Involving operators and other communications industry clients in 
management and technology roadmap alignment processes  
 
This process is extended to address not just service level features but 
also architectural elements including in effect choices of supplier 
alternatives . 
 
e) Timely and effective patent and IPR swap agreements with royalty 
payments or compensation payments 
 
This mechanism has long been used for essential patents used mandated 
for architectural compliance in standards, but being extended to outright  
IPR licensing businesses to selected other communications industry 
suppliers (e.g. agreements around Bluetooth technology , 3G technology , 
handset platform technologies and industrialization packages )  
 
f) Branding policy by communications industry suppliers (individually or 
collectively) of communications software applications or packages ,instead 
of letting the software , IT or semiconductor industry do it  
 
This mechanism both keeps the customer trust image ,but is also a way to 
multiply the adoption of IPR or API’s owned by the communications 
industry . Examples include System availability Forum , BREW ( by 
Qualcomm) , etc.. 
 
g) Aggressive personnel policies offering technical career tracks and prestige  
 
This process ,probably initially tested at IBM and Bell Labs  , has spread 
widely  to the communications industry suppliers .However , are too often 
rewarded in this way old skills ,rather than novel areas or skills stimulating 
disruptive innovation and competivity . 
 
h) Innovative business process ,tariff/charging/rating/ payment schemes 
benefiting the operators and supported by innovative business processes 
embedded inside the technical systems and products  
 
The 3G Mobile Internet,and IPv6 areas start to offer such cases , although 
the staff involved at the communications industry supplier’s is rarely 
looked positively upon for such non-technical innovation . Often ,this work 
is left to consultants and the competence capital and customer trust 
capital decrease 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The communications industry supplier’s face far deeper challenges than the 
financial situation and demand evolution . The consolidation processes in this 
industry cannot ignore the predatory ambitions by other industries , and the 
identification of mismatch between the suppliers themselves and with others 
in terms of IPR , competence and customer trust , are necessary to enable 
success over time and continued innovation in the best interest of end users . 
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